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Corporations, both at Coi-mmon Law and under the
Statute, act by and through their trustees and agents,
and cannot act otherwise. It is a part of the contract
of subscription of a share-holder that the affairs of the
corporation shall be governed and controlled by its
directors, trustees, or other duly authorized agents.
It has, for this reason, been held to be an implied con-
dition in the formation of every association of a busi-
ness character, that the majority of members present at
a share-holders' meeting shall have authority to bind the
whole association by their vote. Each and every share-
holder contracts that the will of the majority shall gov-
ern in all matters coming within the limits of the act
This rule was laid down by Chiefof incorporation.
in DLrfee
Justice Rigelow~vs. the Old Colony R. R. Co. 5 Allen,242
as follows :
be
"It may stated as an indisputable proposi-
tion that every person who becomes a member of a cor-
poration alregate, by purchasing and holding shares,
agreos, by necessary implication, that he v~i]l be bound
by all acts and proceedings wilhin the scope of the
powers and authority conferred by the charte- which shall
be sanctioned or adopted by a vote of the corporation
duly taken and ascertained acoording to law. This is
the result of the fundaental principle that the majority
of the stock-holders can regulate and control the lawful
exercise of the powers conferred on a corporation by its
charter." It is implied that the majority shall have
supreme authority to direct the policy of the corporation
in attaining its chalered purposes and shall have the
power to appoint the usual managing agents to whom the
tivediate control and direction of the company's busi-
ness is delegated. While the general principle is, as
has been stated, there are are some rights which persons
representing the minority of the stock possess, and of
these I shall treat.
Right to Examine Books.
It was formerly held in England, that stock-holders,
unless in the majority and by an appointed agent, could
not examine the books of the corporation at their own
pleasure. IEl. and El. 289. In the United States,
however, the prevailing doctrine appears to be that the
individual share-holders have the same right to examine
the company's books,as the members of an ordinary partner
ship have to the firm books. The doctrine and reason of
this law is, that the books are the commnon property of
the corporation, though they are necessarily kept by
some one person, or perchance in the possession of the
majority. 105 Penn. St. 111, 116.
In many states statutes have been passed givin, the
share-holder the right, with certain limitations and
restrictions, to inspect the books in a respectable man-
ner, and even to obtain a sworn statement of their con-
dition from the agents of the corporation. Statutes of
New York, Act of 1848, Chap. 40, secs. 2:, 27. Amend-
ed L. 1854, Chap. 201, and Laws 1862, (hap. 472.
It is clearl-T a right of a share-holder to obtain a
rigrht of production of the company's books in a legal
proceeding,,vhenever he can base this right to inspec-
tion either upon statutes or established rules of prac-
rice. His remedy, in case of a refusal , is a mandamus
against the company to allow an inspection. 5 Cowen,
419. 1 Q. B. 282.
Right to Certificates of Stocks.
It is customary to issue to each share-holder of the
corporation, a certificate statinr the number of shares
held by him and anything else that is necessary to in-
dicate his standing as a share-holder in the corpora-
tion. These certificates are treated as representing
the shares themselves, and are issued to enable the share
holder to transfer and negotiate his stock in a free and
unincumbered manner. If the charter provides that
these certificates shall be issued, or if it is custo-
mary and usual that they are issued, the agents of the
company are bound to issue a certificate in the customary
form to each holder of shares upon the company's books.
They have no right to discriminate against particular
share-holders under these circumstances. I. N. Y. 416.
Right to Transfer and Record.
A transfer of stock at Common Law could not be
enforced in a Law Court, but could be in a Court of
Equity. The doctrine was in those early times, that
there was necessarily novation in an operation of this
kind, and that,in order to have novation, there must be
consent, express or implied, on the part of all the
other mriembers. 3 1 ". and K. 20 ; 10 Hare 163.
Corporations and joint stock companies, organized
under statutory provisions, are governed by other rules.
It is implied in the charter +hat the share-holders may
transfer stock at will by simply giving notice to the
Of course, reasonable rules
regarding the transfer may be made by the managing
agents of the corporation, as to the manner in which
shares may and shall be transferred. But they cannot
prohibit transfers entirely, and any unreasonable re-
strictions on the right to transfer will not be allowed.
Thus a majority of the stock-holders of the corporation
cannot, without express provision in the charter, pass
a by-law making the right to transfer shares depend upon
the approval of the board of dir-ectors or any other
agent of the company. 48 Iowa, 339 ; 8 Pick, 90.
The right of a share-holder to transfer his shares
is founded upon the implied tenis of his contract of
memb er sh i p. It is a legal right based upon contract.
The refusal of the ap:ent of the corporation to transfer
company of the trans fer.
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the shares does not cancel the shares and put an end to
the contract of membership. The right of action still
exists and the vendor would have his action against the
company.
It has been held by some courts that mandamus is
the proper remedy to compel the officers of the corpor-
ation to make a transfer. 9 Cal. 112 ; 45 Ind. 1 ;
2 South Car. 25; but the weight of authority is the other
way. l5 Minn. 177 ; 46 Ivo. 155 ; 47 Mich. 429 ; 6 Hill
243 ; 110 i,,iass. 95. Mandamnus, being a purely legal
remedy, ou ,,ht not to be granted at the suit of one who
has a mere equitable interest, as the claim of the vend-
oi, will be in almost all cases. 127 Iviass. 104 ; 47 Mich
429.
Right to Vote and Elections (lenerally.
Since the power to appoint directorswould, on gen-
eral principles of law, even in the absence of special
regulations, rest in the members, and as membership con-
sists principally in the ownership of shares, and the
right to and the ownership of such shares is evidenced
by the certificates of stock prepared and vouched for
by the corporate agent, and as such certificates may be
held by the original owners or transferred by assijnment
to others, it is deduced on a fundamental principle that
holding stock constitutes membership in a corporation
and carries with it the right to vote. This right is
incident to the relation which the corporators bear to
the corporation, and is one of those absolute rights,
to deprive him of which would be a violation of his con-
But it is held in Becket vs. Hous-
ton, 3) Ind. 393, that it is not always necessary or
essential that the owners of stock have a certificate
thereof, to entitle them to vote for directors.
As has been said, the power of electing directors
is lodged in the stock-holders. If the exercise of
this power is regulated by statute, the corporation can-
not by its by-laws, resolutions,or contracts, either take
or give it away. When the statute is silent in this
respect, the election of directors, like the election or
appointment of subordinate officers, would be subject to
the regulation and control of the corporation ; but, if
the statute expressly declares who shall be entitled to
vote for directors, its provisions are imperative on the
corporation, forming a part of the law of its being
stitutional ri ,,Jts.
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and the corporation has no power to extend or limit the
right as revul tted by statute. Brewster vs. Hartley.
37 Cal. 1b.
Under certain circumstances it seems that a Court
of Equity might enjoin a stock-holder from voting a par-
ticular stock. But such injunction can only issue when
the complainant can show a plain purpose of parties to
vote the stock, and to vote it a particular way ; that
the effect of the vote ,,Till be to control the election
that the mischief will result to the corporation, and
that irreparable or permanent mischief will come either
to the corporation itself or to the stockholders. The
right itself is clear, but the circunstances upon which
the relief will be granted must be very clear.
So, also, where a combination or conspiracy can be
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shown for the purpose of controllin, an election in
fraud of the rights of those share-holders who are not
in the combination, an injunction will insue . .5: Barb.
344 ; 5 Blatchf, 525. But such an injunction w;ill not
prevent the election from taking place. On the con-
trary, the election goes on, and is valid even though it
happen that what would have been a minority of the votes,
had not the injunction issued, becomes by reason thereof
a majority and elects. Ryder vs. Alton & R. R. 13 Ills.
516.
The general rule, however, unquestionably is, that
one stock-holder has nothing to do with the vote of
another stock-holder, and can law'ull;y do nothing to
abridgP[e The rijht of another to vote or to control or
direct the castins, of th -, vote of any other member of
the corporation . Alton R. R. Co. Case, Supra.
There are various wayrs in which an iflegTal or
fraudulent election of directors or managers of an in-
corporated company can be investigated, the fraud un-
earthed ind the ill egality set aside. In New York, the
Supreme Court sitting as a Court of Chancery is empowered
to review corporate elections, and to grant relief as the
particular circumstances and justice of the case seem to
re qti re. Under this power, granted by statute, an
election may be declared void by reason of the conspir-
acy, frauds , or trickery on the part of the corporators.
Schoharie Valley R. R. Case, 12 Abb. Prac. (1i. S.) 394.
In the application of Syracuse etc. R. R. Co. 91 N. Y. I.
Stockholders owning a majority of +he stock have a right
to combine and secure the election of a board of direc-
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tors, provided it be without fraud in forming the com-
bination; and this is done every day. But the co.bine
must be without fraud ; otherwise an injunction will lie
in favor of the minorityT.
At Comnon Law mandamus would lie in favor of stock-
holders who desired an election. Under the statutes
of New York the rigrht is given them to compel an el ec-
rich. If the directors could keep themselves in office
by not having an annual election, the stock-holders would
be powerless, and the officers once elected might per-
petuate themselves in power as long as they chose. Such
a course would be in direct opTposition to the mandatory
provision, requiring that the trustees, annually elected,
shall manape the affairs of the corporation. The enac t-
ment prevents any such arbitrary use of power and pro-
tects the stock-holders of corporations from the mis-
'I qis is inconduct of their officers in titis respect.
entire harmony with the provisions of the 1 Janufacturing
Act, and does not in any way conflict with the rir ht of
the officers to make reasonable and prudential regula-
tions and unless for the management and disposition of
the stock and business affairs of the company. People
vs. Cumings, 72 N. Y. , 4&3 ; 61 Rarb., 397 ; 10 Nevada
167.
Cook says "The minority in such incorporated bodies
are under an implied obligation to submit to the will
of the majority. " He is right as far as he goes, but
he should add, "in cases only where there is neither
conspiracy or fraud'.
At Coimon Law a stock-holder had no rigjht to cast
The statutes in most of the states,
however, have regulated the iiatter, so that now a stock-
holder may vote by his attorney or by proxy and, although
with the minority, his vote counts. The corporate of-
ficers elected by the majority have no right, neither
can they make any laws or rules chanpging tie statutory
right to vote by proxy, or fix such rules as will im-
pose upon the minority hardships and difficulties.
Members in the minorit7y are entitled to notice of
election, except where the time is fixed by the charter.
Where no sufficient time is fixed by charter or statute
or by-law, each stock-holder is entitled to an express
personal notice of every corporate meeting. No usage
can operate to excuse a failure to give such a notice,
and it has been held that custom or by-laws cannot
his vote byr proxi..
change or abroi,ate the right to a notice of corporate
mee tings. The King vs. Bird. 13 East, 367.
Right to restrain Ultra Vires Acts.
A sin jle share-holder has mple power to restrain
a corporation from diverting the corporate funds from
the purposes for which they were ori,1'inally intended,
and ordinarily can prevent any ultra vires act ; pro-
vided, alwiays, that he is not chargeable with acts or
omissions by which his ri.,hts can be held waived or
forfeited. Thus a share-holder in a railroad corpora-
tion may enjoin the carrying out of an ultra vires lease
of the road. 41 N. J. Eq. 1, or the performance of an
illegal contract, 24 Pa. St. 378. A minority or even
a sinfle share-holder may restrain the corporation or
the corporate management from diverting the corporate
funds to unauthorized purposes. L-2 11. 1. !T5hus.
company, chartered to manufacture pi, iron, may be en-
joined by one of its stock-holders from erecting a corn
and flour mill. 52 Ga. 276.
Unless the right to alter or repeal is reserved
to the state or some express provision in the original
instr-inent covers the matter, the charter or articles
of association cannot, against the vwill of a sinfle
stock-holder, be substantially altered by the Legisla-
ture, even with the consent of the majority. 24, 11. J.
Fl. 4)5. This is because of the impliod agreement be-
tween the state and the corporation. Of course it is
not a c.ontract in the sense that A contracts with B.
On the contrary, in he charter the state does not pur-
port to contract with the corporation nor the corpora-
Thus a
The terms and provisions of the
contract ave rather rules of law which will manifest
;hejiselves in lefal relations betw,;en the corporators
and between them and ofher persons contracting in re-
spect to +,he corporate enterprise. The agreement on
the part of the state is that it will not alter or re-
peal these rules of law. And a share-holder has his
remedy by injunction to restrain the acceptance of any
radical amencdment. 4 Riss. 78 ; 6 Ohio St. 119.
Still the Legislature may confer on the corporation
additional powers tending to facilitate the accomplish-
jent Of the original purposes of incorporation. 10 1. J.
Fq. 171.
It is the duty of the corporate manappment to con-
duct the affairs of +,he corporation in the interests of
tion with the state..
share-holders as such ; and the management 1:rill not be
justified in promotim outside inte'ests of a majority
of share-holders in disreard to the interests of never
so small a minority. A court will interfere at the
suit of a minority when the majority seek to appropriate
the assets of the company or to obtain for themselves
advantages not shared by, the minoritr. :31, IVlinn 140
2B Blatchf. 517 ; 11 Daly 373.
In the case of Goodin vs. the Cincinnatti etc.
Canal Co. , 18 Ohio St. , 169, Justice Welsh, in deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court, said : "To undertake, by
getting control of the company, and then, under pretense
of acting as agents or trustees for all the stock-hold-
ers, deliberately to tr.iTple under foot the rights of
the minority is rather a sharp practice and one which a
Court of Equity will never tolerate. "
share-holders, on behalf of themselves and other share-
holders, may, for conspiracy and fraud or acts ultra
vires whereby their interests have been sacrificed, main-
tain a bill in equity against the corporation, its of-
fi,:ers and others who have participated in the wrongful
acts. 6 Allen 52.
Ultra Vires Acts in Reference to
Sales, Consolidation, etc.
That a charter constitutes a contract between the
corporation and its stock-holders is a principle of law
that has become firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of
modern times. Upon this principle of law rests the
stability, permanence, and honesty of managenment of cor-
porations, particularly those of railroads, and from it
minority of
arises much of the confidenoe, safety and protection of
the stock-holder himself.
It was first proiulgated in America in 1820 in
Livingston vs. Lynch, 4 Johns. 37a.3. 3, and was applied
to corporations in the Hartford and New Haven R. R. Co.
vs. Croswell, 5 Hill 383 (1843). These cases have been
followed by a long line of supporting decisions. They
--lere the first to establish clearly that any act or
proposed act of the corporation or of the directors of
a majority of the stock-holders, which is not vithin the
express or implied powers of the charter of incorpora-
tion or association,- in other words, any ultra vires
acts, is a breach of contract between the corporation
and each of its stock-holders, and that consequently
at any one or more of the stock-holders may object
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thereto and compel the corporation to observe the terms
of the contract as set forth in the charter.
The case of Abbot vs. the Aerican Hard Rubber Co.,
33 Barb. b78 (1861) clearly established the principle
in this country that a dissenting stock-holder may pre-
vent the sale by the directors, or by a majority of the
stock-holders, of corporate property which is essential
to the continuance of the business of the corporation or
the payment of corporate debts. And even where a dis-
solution is the purpose in view, if the corporation is a
prosperous one it is ex'taemely doubtful whether such
sale can be made. The old Comon Law doctrine, that
a majority of the stock-holders may at any time effect
a voluntary1 dissolution, is still maintained. Rut if
the purpose of such dissolution is not the bona fide
discontinuance of such business, but is the continuance
of that business by a new corporation, then the better
and latfer rule is that a dissenting stock-holder may
prevent the sale even though it is made with a view of
dissolving the corporation. This is the law laid down
by the well reasoned case of Kean vs. Johnson, 9 N.J.
Fq. 401, the court saying :" It is not true that a
majority of stock-holders in any corporatinn, however
prosperous their affairs may be, can at their own mere
caprice, sell out the whole source of their emolunents,
invest their capital in other enterprises and that, how-
ever the minority may desire the prosecution of the bus-
in whi ch
inessthey had engaged, they have no injury to complain
of at Law or in equity so lone as they obtain their
portion of the proceeds of the sale. If such wvere the
law, corporations would soon be few, for seldom would
capitalists, whatever their comparitive wealth, invest
in enterprises so readily rendered profitless at the
caprice or in obedience to the interests of arn, set of
men or a sinole man rich enourh to con+-'ol a majority
of the stock.' And even where the majority have a
statutory power to dissolve the corporation at their
pleasure, yet they cannot use that power to defraud the
minority out of the fair valuation of their property.
Wall ace J. saying in the ca se of Ewin vs. the Oregon
Ry & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. Rep., 635, "A dissolution under
such circunstances is an abuse of the powers delegated
to the majority. It is no less wrong because accom-
plished by the ag-ency of legal forms.
Such dissolutions are practically frauds on the law
and on dissenting and minority stock-holders.
seek to do indirectly what cannot legal]y be done di-
re ctl y. If, however, the corporation is an unprofit-
able and failing enterprize, then a sale of all the cor-
porate property with a view of dissolution may be made by
a majority of the stock-holders. 30 Penn. St. 42. The
reason for this is that it would be unjust for one men-
ber to hold his fellow members to an investinent that is
unprofitable and impracticable, and prevent them from
embarkinpr in another that is more remunerative. If the
sale is made to another corporation, the stock of the
latter cannot be forced upon the dissenting stock-hold-
ers. They are entitled to their money.
These principles of law are important, particularly
when a consolidation of ,orporations is attempted by a
They
dissolution of one of them.
for the purpose of transacting their own husiness and
not for the purpose of allowin . others to do it for
them. Unless the charter expressly confers upon the
company the right to consolidate, a minority could pre-
vent such consolidation. Thonas vs. Railroad Co. 101
U. S. 82 ; Tro etc. R. R. Go. vs. Boston & R. R. Co.,
86 N. Y. 117 ; Kean vs. Johnson, 8 1'. J. Eq. 401,
Clinch vs. Financial Co. L. R. ; 5 Eq. 4 .
By far the greater nunber of cases involvinig acts
which are ultra vires affectinm the rights of stock-
holders are cases groiving out of attempted consolidation,
absorption, lease or sale of the property of one rail-
road corporation by or with tiat of another railroad
The tendency of railroads in these modern
Corporations are form~ed
co rpot al-io n.
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times is towards the consolidation and creation of trunk
lines which serve to annihil ate small er concerns. The
demands of coiimerce have caused the consolidation and
absorption of smaller corporations by larger, 4,ich -have
given rise to many decisions analyzing the different
a-ansaction incident there',o and adjustinm' the rights of
the parties on equitable principles. Is it any wonder
that men who have million of dollars involved in a bus-
iness enterprize, but who nevertheless have no say as
to the manner of its uise, should cry out to the courts
and Legislatures of the states to help them ? 13ut is
the right of the minority stock-holder to be considered
supreme when the needs of this growing country call for
a consolidation of two vast enterprises in order to
facilitate business, or is he -,o be allowed to clog the
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wheels of comnerce because he has a few paltry dollars
at stake ? No; he may object for fraud, conspiracy or
trickery, but where the promotion of the interests of
all concerned will be attained, he will either be ob-
ligd to submit or step down and out.
Right to Dividends.
The ultimate object for which every ordinary bus-
is formed
iness corporation~is for the pecuniary profit of its in-
dividual members. Any net increase of the capital of
an institution of this kind is a gain upon the united
investment of its shiare-holders, and may be distributed
amongst then as profits, each share-holder beiwg entitled
to his proportionate dividend or share. Of the differ-
ent kinds of dividends I shall not speak, as the rules
of La- applicable to one are applicable to all.
The power of determining whether a corporation has
earned a surplus which w(*uld warrant the payment of a
dividend is vested in a board of directors. In exer-
cising this power the directors cannot act arbif,,-arily
they must make an investigat"ion of the affairs of
corporation and must in good faith apply the princi-
pies of good business judgment, coupled with fairness,
to the t.'ansaction. But the directors cannot be held
liable for a mere mistake of jud gment in rna>ing an
erroneous valuation of the corpany's assets. Stringers
Case, 4 Chan. 475.
Profits earned by a corporation may and should be
distributed Ljion1- its share-holders ; but it is not a
violation of the charter if they are allowed to accumnu-
Thelate, and remain invested in the company's business.
managin; agents of a corporation are iinpliedly vested
with a discretionary power with regard to the kind and
manner of distributing its profits. Pratt vs. Pratt,
33 Conn. 446 ; Karnes vs. Rochester etc. R. R. Co.
4 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 107 ; Barry vs. h:Ier. Ex. Co. 1 Sandfs.
Chan. 280, 303. They may apply the profits to the
payment of a floatim', or funded debt or in the develop-
ment of the company's business ; but so long as they do
not abuse their discretionary powers or violate the corn-
pany's charter, the court cannot interfere. State vs.
Bank of Louisianna, 6 La. 745 ; Smith vs. Prattville
1ij f'g Co. , 29 Ala. 503.
But it is also clear that the agents of a corpora-
tion and even a majority cannot arbitrarily withhold
profits earned by the company or apply them to any use
which is not authorized by the compainy's charter.
majority of the share-holders of a corpora tien, or the
directors thereof, wrongfull. refuse to declare a divi-
dend, and distribute profits earnod by: the company, any
share-holder feeling, aprieved may obtain relief in
Equity. Stevens vs. South Devon Ry Co., 9 Hare 313.
Beers vs. Bridgport Spring Co., 42 Conn. 17; Scott vs.
Eagle Fire Co., 7 Paige 20.3 ; Browne vs. I,onmouthshire
Ry Co., 13 Beav. 32.
In Faucett vs. Lourie, I Drew. & Si. , it was held
that a declaration of a dividend gives the share-holders
such a legal right to the payment of it that a Court of
Chancery will not, at the suit of a sirngle share-holder,
interfere by an injunction to restrain the riirectors
from pay ing it.
Ifra
Suits against corporations to enforce the payment of
dividends cannot be iraintained until a demamd has been
i:iade and payment refused.
etc. R. R. Co., 6 Gill. 368.
'52 Barb. 4 5 ; State vs. Balt.
A Court of ChanceryT will
upon the application of any dissenting member, enjoin an
attempt to distribute any part of the capital stock as
a dividend.
Pr. 277;
Carpenter vs. IT. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 5 Abb.
Salisbury vs. 1M.ietropo Iitan Ry Co. 38 L. J.
Chan. 249.
In general the declaration of a dividendi rests
entirely with the directors. The free exercise of
their discretion cannot be interferred with by the con-
trac t of the promoters or the original incorporators
as to the disposition of corporate profits. But when
money which ought to have been divided anongr the stock-
holders has been applied by the (;irpctors to a purpose
not iva Tantkd by and not within the scope of the charter,
there is such a broach of trust as to rive a Court of
Equity jurisdiction. And obviously whenever there is a
clear abuse of power on the part of the corporation man-
agement and a refusal to declare a dividend that ouht to
be declared, a Court of EqiLty will at the instance of
any share-holder, provided there is no laches, compel
t ae proper authorities to declare and pay the dividend.
There can be no dispute and it is a well knovwn fact,
especially anong business men, that those who hold a
minority of the stock of the corporation are often
shaiefully abused and their ripghts disregarded. They
seldom have any representation on the board of directors
and thus know li tl+e of the inside workings of the man-
aPjement of thie corporation affairs.
tendency by the courts in recent times to alleviate this
suffering on the part of the minority and to give them a
recognition, at least, where it has been demanded.
There are unfortunately few, if any, adjudicated cases
on this point and it is only from the dicta of judges
that we can see this.
The Legislatures of some of the states have also
seen fit to make some enactments in this direction.
There is now a bill before the Legislature of this state
in which it is attempted to provide a method by which a
minority may have a representation on the board o.f
dire ctors. It provides that for a certain number of
directors to be elected, each stock-holder shall vote for
but a limited niiber, generally one or two more than half
The 'e has been a
the whole number to be elected.
be possible for the minority to obtain reprsentation
where before it was ]Jip)os"ible. This is a step in the
right direction ; and while it is not best that the
majority should be subject to all the petty whims of
the minority, still it is advisable that they have some
means of knowing what is being done with their invest-
ments, and that they should have a representative present
who may object at the proper time to any unrighteous and
malicious action on the part of the majority.
7
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By this means it vill

